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OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT ABDUCTIONS
IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTRADITION
TREATIES
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,' the United States Supreme
Court held that a defendant who was abducted from Mexico in or-
der to be tried for an alleged crime cannot prevent United States
courts from exercising personal jurisdiction over him, even though
the United States has an extradition treaty with Mexico and the ab-
duction was conducted under the authority of United States govern-
ment officials. This Note examines the opinions of Alvarez-Machain
and concludes that the case was wrongly decided; the Court should
have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. This Note explains
that the majority erred in failing to distinguish this case from Ker v.
Illinois,2 in which the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction could be
exercised over a defendant who was abducted by an official acting
only under his personal authority. This Note also argues that given
the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico3 - in-
cluding the Treaty's purposes, detailed provisions of the Treaty pro-
viding for exceptions to extradition requirements, the history of
Mexico's understanding of the Treaty, and the background of inter-
national law in general-official abductions are implicitly prohib-
ited. Given Supreme Court precedents preventing jurisdiction in
the context of treaty violations, the United States government's vio-
lation of the Treaty should have prohibited personal jurisdiction.
Finally, this Note suggests that the Alvarez-Machain opinion sends an
ominous message to treaty partners that in the event that the United
States carries out its treaties in bad faith, the nation's highest court
may sanction such actions.
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1 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
2 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
3 Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.- Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondent Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a medical doctor by
profession, is a citizen and resident of Mexico. 4 Dr. Alvarez-
Machain was indicted for his alleged involvement in the 1985 kid-
napping and murder of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar and Alfredo Zavala-Avelar, a Mexi-
can pilot working for the agent.5 The United States government al-
leged that Dr. Alvarez-Machain prolonged Agent Camarena's life so
that his kidnappers could continue their torture and interrogation. 6
On April 2, 1990, five or six armed men forcibly abducted Dr.
Alvarez-Machain from his medical office in Guadalajara, Mexico,
and flew him to El Paso, Texas, where he was arrested by DEA
agents. 7 The abductors, Mexican citizens, presumably kidnapped
Dr. Alvarez-Machain in order to obtain a $50,000 reward offered by
the DEA for the delivery of Dr. Alvarez-Machain to DEA custody in
the United States." The District Court for the Central District of
California found as a matter of fact that the DEA hired the
abductors. 9
Alvarez-Machain moved to dismiss his indictment on the
grounds that the DEA abduction constituted outrageous govern-
ment conduct, which violated due process.' 0 Moreover, Alvarez-
Machain asserted that the district court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion"' over him because the abduction violated the Extradition
Treaty12 between the United States and Mexico. 13 Under the prece-
dent of United States v. Rauscher,14 Dr. Alvarez-Machain suggested,
4 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190.
5 Id.
6 Id
8 United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 603 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2188 (1992).
9 Id at 602-04.
10 Id. at 604. The claim of outrageous government conduct was an attempt by the
attorneys of Dr. Alvarez-Machain to fit the facts of his case into a line of circuit court
decisions creating an exception to Ker. According to this line of cases, abductions do
not violate due process except in the event that torture was used in carrying out the
abduction. See, e.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974).
11 Personal jurisdiction, or in personam jurisdiction, is defined as the "[p]ower which
a court has over the defendant himself in contrast to the court's power over the defend-
ant's interest in property.., or power over the property itself.... A court which lacks
personal jurisdiction is without power to issue an in personamjudgment." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990).
12 Extradition Treaty, supra note 3.
13 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2190 (1992).
14 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
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United States courts are precluded from asserting personal jurisdic-
tion in the face of a treaty violation 1 5 The district court rejected the
due process claim.' 6 However, it held that the abduction violated
the Extradition Treaty, and that a diplomatic note from the Mexican
Embassy to the United States Department of State constituted a for-
mal protest giving the respondent standing to invoke the treaty vio-
lation. 17 The court therefore concluded that it lacked personal
jurisdiction over the respondent.' 8 On these grounds, the district
court dismissed the indictment and ordered that Dr. Alvarez-
Machain be repatriated to Mexico. 19
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit up-
held the dismissal of the indictment.20 In doing so, the Ninth Cir-
cuit relied on United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.21 In Verdugo II, the
court similarly held that an abduction authorized by the United
States violated the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, despite
the Treaty's lack of an explicit prohibition on abductions, because
the basic purpose of the Treaty was violated by a forcible abduc-
tion. 22 This violation, combined with a formal protest by the Mexi-
can government, gave the defendant standing to invoke the
violation to prevent the court from obtaining personal jurisdic-
tion.23 Similarly, the official United States abduction of Dr. Alvarez-
Machain, combined with a formal protest by the Mexican govern-
ment, prevented the court from hearing the Alvarez-Machain case,
according to the Ninth Circuit. 24
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 25
15 See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 606 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aft'd
sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S.
Ct. 2188 (1992).
16 Id. at 605-06.
17 Id. at 608-09.
18 Id. at 614.
19 Id.
20 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
21 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992)[hereinafter Verdugo
Il]. The holding of Verdugo II was vacated by the Supreme Court in light of its decision
in Alvarez-Machain. Verdugo II, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992). Therefore, Verdugo II was still
good law when the Supreme Court heard Alvarez-Machain. The Supreme Court had pre-
viously heard the Verdugo-Urquidez case on different grounds, in a case known as Verdugo
I. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
22 Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1350.
23 Id. at 1352-53.
24 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
25 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 857 (1992). It also may be of interest
that subsequent to the holding of the Supreme Court, Judge Edward Rafeedie of the
United States District Court for the Central District of California, on remand, dismissed
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III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,2 6 ChiefJustice Rehnquist began by ex-
plaining the precedents of Ker v. Illinois27 and United States v. Rau-
scher.28 In Ker, the defendant Frederick Ker was brought to trial on
larceny charges in Illinois after being abducted from Peru, a country
with which the United States had an extradition treaty.29 The ab-
duction in Ker was carried out by a United States agent acting in his
individual, rather than official, capacity.30 The Court in Ker held
that, since abductions were not specifically prohibited by the treaty,
the treaty was not called into question by the abduction; the treaty
thereby did not prevent the United States courts from obtaining
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 31 In contrast, the Court in
Rauscher held that even though the 1842 Webster-Ashburton Treaty
between the United States and Great Britain did not explicitly pro-
hibit it, the "manifest scope and object of the treaty"3 2 mandated
that after a defendant was extradited for a specified offense, the
United States courts could not try him for a different offense.33 In
essence, the Court in Rauscher held that trying a defendant in the
face of a treaty violation, in and of itself, precluded United States
court jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that Ker and Rauscher address
two separate types of incidents: Ker for forcible abductions from
other countries, and Rauscher for claimed violations of treaties.3 4
Thus, according to the majority, without a treaty violation, as in
Rauscher, the holding of Rauscher was not applicable, and Ker was the
the charges against Dr. Alvarez-Machain, claiming the evidence against him was merely
based on "hunches" and the "wildest speculation." Seth Mydans,Judge Clears Mexican in
Agent's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at A20.
26 Chief'Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas.
27 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
28 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
29 Ker, 119 U.S. at 437-39.
30 Specifically in Ker, Henry G.Julian, a messenger, was given a warrant by the Presi-
dent of the United States, and told to demand Ker's extradition by the Peruvian authori-
ties in compliance with an extradition treaty with Peru. However, upon arriving in Peru,
Julian, acting without any United States government authorization, forcibly abducted
Ker and brought him to the United States. Id. at 438.
31 Id. at 443-44.
32 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 422.
33 Id. at 419-30. This principle is known as the doctrine of specialty. See, e.g., United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2191 (1992).
34 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191.
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controlling case.a5 In trying to show that Ker was, in fact, the con-
trolling case, ChiefJustice Rehnquist de-emphasized the importance
of the two main differences between the Alvarez-Machain case and
Ker. First, unlike the abduction of Alvarez-Machain, the Ker abduc-
tion was not officially sponsored by the United States government.
Second, the Peruvian government did not protest the abduction in
Ker, as the Mexican government had done in Alvarez-Machain.3 6
After establishing an analogy between the instant case and Ker,
the Court then proceeded to interpret the 1978 Extradition Treaty
between the United States and Mexico,3 7 first looking at the plain
terms of the Treaty.38 The Court's purpose in interpreting the
Treaty was to determine whether or not it prohibited abductions. If
it did, then Rauscher would prohibit United States court jurisdiction
in the face of a treaty violation. If it did not prohibit abductions,
Rauscher would not be applicable, and jurisdiction could properly be
asserted. The majority noted that the Treaty made no explicit men-
tion of abductions,3 9 and then proceeded to show that the Treaty
also did not implicitly forbid abductions.40 Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the specific provisions of the Treaty were not meant
to be exclusive, but merely constituted one means by which both of
the countries could gain custody of someone in the other country
for the purpose of criminal prosecution. 41
The Court continued its analysis of the Treaty by examining the
history of negotiations and practices under the Treaty. 42 As early as
1906, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the Mexican government was
made aware that Ker allowed forcible abductions performed outside
of extradition treaties, yet the 1978 Treaty demonstrated no attempt
by the Mexican government to contract around Ker.4 3 In addition,
in 1935, a prominent group of scholars proposed language for in-
clusion in extradition treaties that would explicitly forbid abduc-
tions.44 However, neither this language, nor a comparable clause,
was included in the Treaty. 45
35 Id. at 2193.
36 Id.
37 Extradition Treaty, supra note 3.
38 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 2193-95.
41 Id. at 2194.
42 Id. at 2194-95.
43 Id. at 2194.
44 See id. (citing Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
With Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 623-32 (Supp. 1935)[hereinafter Harvard
Research]).
45 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194.
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The majority continued its analysis of the implied provisions of
the Treaty with an analysis of the Treaty's background in light of
customary international law.46 Here, the majority claimed that the
argument put forth by Dr. Alvarez-Machain was logically inconsis-
tent in that it distinguished Ker by saying no formal protest was
made there by the Peruvian government, while at the same time, the
argument of Dr. Alvarez-Machain claimed that the Treaty was self-
executing and had the force of law.47 If the latter were in fact true,
the majority claimed, then the courts could enforce the Treaty with-
out any formal protest.4 8
More importantly, the majority continued, the dissent sought to
read general principles of international law into a specific treaty,
while in Rauscher, the Court merely looked at international law spe-
cifically relating to extradition treaties. 49 Extrapolating on the dis-
sent's reasoning, the majority concluded that, in light of the general
principle of international law against asserting one nation's police
power in the sovereign territory of another nation, extradition trea-
ties would be held to prevent the waging of war in another coun-
try.50 Because such a conclusion would be absurd, the majority held
that, even if the Alvarez-Machain abduction was "shocking" 5 1 and a
violation of the general principles of international law, the decision
of whether to repatriate the defendant was a matter outside of the
Treaty and should be left to the Executive Branch.52 As the Treaty
was not violated in this case, Rauscher should not apply. In accord-
ance with Ker, the majority held that the United States courts have
personal jurisdiction over the respondent.53
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens 54 attempted to
demonstrate how the Extradition Treaty was, in fact, violated by the
abduction, and thus Rauscher applied to this case, rather than Ker.55
He began by construing the Treaty itself which, in contrast to the
majority, he said was meant to be all-inclusive on the subject of ex-
46 Id. at 2195-96.
47 Id. at 2195.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 2195-96.
50 Id. at 2196.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id at 2197.
54 Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor.
55 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197-2206 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tradition, given the totality of the Treaty's extradition provisions.5 6
In looking to the parties' expectations when making the Treaty,
Justice Stevens noted that the drafters of the Treaty would not have
imagined that the Treaty allowed abductions, given its stated pur-
pose of fostering cooperation and mutual assistance. 57 The exten-
sive exceptions in the Treaty for when extradition is not appropriate
"would serve little purpose if the requesting country could simply
kidnap the person." s58 Taking the majority's reasoning to an ex-
treme, the dissent said the majority would claim that it was permissi-
ble under the Treaty to simply torture or execute the suspect in the
other country, in the name of expedience, given that such an act was
not explicitly prohibited by the Treaty. 59 Clearly, the dissenting
opinion argued, the basic scope and object of the Treaty "plainly
imply a mutual understanding to respect the territorial integrity of
the other contracting party." 60
Justice Stevens then attempted to demonstrate how the
grounds for denying jurisdiction in this case were far more compel-
ling than the grounds upon which jurisdiction in Rauscher was de-
nied.6' Justice Stevens argued that the Alvarez-Machain case
constituted an even clearer instance of a treaty violation than Rau-
scher. To begin with, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty in Rauscher was
"far less comprehensive" than the Extradition Treaty in Alvarez-
Machain.62 In addition, the cases cited by Rauscher in support of the
doctrine of specialty63 were not nearly as prevalent as those con-
demning violations of territorial integrity of friendly neighbors cited
in the instant case. 64 Finally, the legal background cited by Rauscher
for the doctrine of specialty was also "far less clear" than the au-
thorities forbidding violations of the territorial integrity of a partner
56 Specifically, Justice Stevens stated:
From the preamble, through the description of the parties' obligations with respect
to offenses committed within as well as beyond the territory of a requesting party,
the delineation of the procedures and evidentiary requirements for extradition, the
special provisions for political offenses and capital punishment, and other details,
the Treaty appears to have been designed to cover the entire subject of extradition.
Id. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 2198 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 2199 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 2200-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Unlike the extensive Extradition Treaty with
Mexico, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty merely contained "one paragraph authorizing
the extradition of fugitives 'in certain cases.' " Id.
63 This doctrine requires that after a person is extradited for a specified offense, the
person may not be tried for a different offense. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
64 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2201 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to an extradition treaty.6 5
Justice Stevens then pointed out what he saw as a critical flaw in
the majority opinion: in drawing analogies to Ker, the majority disre-
garded the distinction between a private abduction in Ker and a gov-
ernment-sponsored abduction in this case.6 6 In support of his
reliance on this distinction, Justice Stevens cited Justice Brandeis in
Cook v. United States.67 Justice Stevens claimed that Cook stands for
the proposition that a crucial difference exists between the acts of
private parties, or even state law enforcement officials, and those of
federal officers acting beyond the authority conferred by a treaty.68
Justice Stevens also noted that in Ker, Justice Miller explicitly distin-
guished Rauscher on the same grounds. 69 Unlike Ker, and just as in
Cook and Rauscher, the acts here were committed by agents author-
ized by the federal government, and thus violated the Treaty.70
Similarly, Justice Stevens pointed out that the proposal of scholars,
cited by the majority, 71 to include language in extradition treaties
explicitly prohibiting abductions, dealt only with cases analogous to
Ker, in which the abductions were performed by private persons. 72
Finally, the dissenting opinion concluded that despite the un-
derstandable desire of the Executive Branch to bring an alleged ac-
complice to the murder of a federal agent to justice, this "provides
no justification for disregarding the Rule of Law that this Court has
a duty to uphold." 73 Justice Stevens stated that when the public de-
sire for revenge is strong, as it is here, it becomes increasingly im-
portant for the Court to provide its judgment dispassionately. 74
Ultimately, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are
read by courts around the world as a source of guidance. Justice
Stevens believed that presumably "most courts throughout the civi-
65 Id at 2202-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Demonstrating the clarity of the legal
background prohibiting violations of territorial integrity of extradition treaty partners,
Justice Stevens quoted the Restatement of Foreign Relations, which illustrates this prin-
ciple. Id. at 2202 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNrTED STATES § 432(2) & cmt. c (1987), which states that
international law demands the repatriation of a person abducted by a state's law enforce-
ment officials from the territory of a second country without the second country's
consent).
66 Id. at 2203-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933)).
68 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 2204 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443
(1886)).
70 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 2194. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
72 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2204 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73 Id at 2205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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lized world .. . will be deeply disturbed by th[is] 'monstrous'
decision ... -5
IV. ANALYSIS
A. THE LEGACY OF KER AND RAUSCHER
The majority opinion began by taking the sensible step of read-
ing Ker v. Illinois7 6 in a limited fashion. 7 7 Ultimately, however, the
Court's reasoning was flawed in not rejecting jurisdiction in this
case, on the grounds that Alvarez-Machain was abducted by govern-
ment officials in what should have been held to constitute a violation
of the Extradition Treaty.
While some commentators78 insist that Ker stands universally
for the doctrine of mala captus bene detentus, 79 ChiefJustice Rehnquist
implicitly recognized otherwise. By viewing United States v. Rau-
scher80 as a case in which the jurisdiction of a court was held to be
limited by the requirements of a treaty,81 Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that the mere presence of a criminal in a United
States court does not automatically confer personal jurisdiction over
him.
On previous occasions, the Supreme Court itself has indicated
that Ker is to be read only in a limited fashion. 82 In two cases involv-
ing government seizures in international waters of vessels engaged
in transportation of alcohol allegedly in violation of the National
Prohibition Act and the Tariff Act, the Court chose not to rely on
Ker since, unlike in Ker, there were treaty violations. The Court in
these two cases noted that the ability of the courts to adjudicate over
seizures of property was directly affected if the seizures occurred in
75 Id. at 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
77 See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191-92.
78 E.g., Mitchell J. Matorin, Unchaining the Law: The Legality of Extraterritorial Abduction
in Lieu of Extradition, 41 DUKE L.J. 907, 910 (1992)(suggesting Ker should be interpreted
to stand for this broad proposition).
79 This ancient doctrine stands for the proposition that the courts may "assert in
personam jurisdiction without inquiring into the means by which the presence of the de-
fendant was secured." I M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED
STATES LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. 5, § 1, at 190 (1987).
80 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
81 Specifically, the treaty was held to implicitly mandate the rule of specialty. See
supra note 33 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); Ford v. United States, 273
U.S. 593 (1927). See generally Harvard Research, supra note 44, at 624-25 (citing Ford and
Cook for the proposition that United States courts will not exercise jurisdiction when a
person is brought to the country through-methods violating treaties).
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violation of United States treaties, here a treaty with Great Britain.83
The Court in Ford distinguished the jurisdiction question from Ker,
as in Ford "a treaty of the United States is directly involved and the
question is [thus] quite different [from Ker]."8 4
In seeming contradiction of a limited reading of Ker, ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist relied on the widely cited statement of Frisbie v. Col-
lins,85 which read Ker as standing for the proposition that "the
power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact
that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of
a 'forcible abduction.' "86 However, because much of the remainder
of the Court's opinion focused on whether or not the United States-
Mexico Extradition Treaty was violated in this case, Chief Justice
Rehnquist implicitly recognized that Frisbie's broad reading of Ker
was, in fact, inaccurate. To read Ker this broadly would make it in-
consistent with Rauscher,8 7 a case in which the method by which a
defendant was brought before a United States court did affect the
court's jurisdiction over him. Particularly in light of the fact that Ker
and Rauscher were handed down by the Supreme Court on the same
day, it seems certain that the two cases were meant to be consistent
with one another. Thus, a limited reading of Ker is in order.
Despite the Court's sensible reading of the limited scope of Ker,
its reliance on Ker for the proposition that extradition treaties do
not implicitly prohibit any abductions was flawed. The majority
struggled to compare the facts of Ker to those of the instant case in
an attempt to downplay the differences between the two cases.88
The Court noted in passing that "[t]he only differences between Ker
83 See Ford, 273 U.S. at 605-06; Cook, 288 U.S. at 120-22.
84 Ford, 273 U.S. at 606.
85 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
86 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2192 (1992)(quoting Frisbie,
342 U.S. at 522).
The holding of Frisbie, allowing for personal jurisdiction despite the defendant's
having been brought before the court by an abduction, should have no precedential
value in this case. The Frisbie abduction was merely an interstate rather than international
abduction. Thus, there was no extradition treaty, nor principles of international law, for
the Court to analyze, as in the Alvarez-Machain case. Thus, other Supreme Court cases
involving interstate abductions similarly are not on point here. E.g., Pettibone v. Nich-
ols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537 (1893); Mahon v. Justice,
127 U.S. 700 (1888). As one of these interstate abduction cases stated, "[tlo apply the
rule of international or foreign extradition, as announced in [Rauscher], to interstate ren-
dition involves the confusion of two essentially different things, which rest upon entirely
different principles." Lascels, 148 U.S. at 545.
87 See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 678, 679
(1953)(proposing that a broad reading of Ker would render it inconsistent with
Rauscher).
88 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
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and the present case are that Ker was decided on the premise that
there was no governmental involvement in the abduction, and the
country of Peru, from which Ker was abducted, did not object to his
prosecution." 89 These "only differences," are crucial, however, and
ultimately should have led to a contrary holding in this case.
The key distinction between this case and Ker is that the abduc-
tion in Ker was not, as here, authorized by the government. In hold-
ing that the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru
was not violated by the abduction, the Court in Ker explicitly stated
that "the facts show that it was a clear case of kidnapping within the
dominions of Peru, without any pretense of authority under the
treaty or from the government of the United States." 90 The fact that the
Court in Ker considered the absence of government involvement
crucial to its holding that the extradition treaty was not violated,
strongly suggests that its holding in Ker would have been otherwise
if, as in Alvarez-Machain, there were government sponsorship.
An official sanction of an abduction in the territory of a treaty
partner flagrantly violates the spirit of an extradition treaty. In the
context of general international law, 9' the fact that an abduction is
officially sponsored is a crucial ingredient of its illegality.92 As one
commentator articulated, "[t]he rule [of international law against
abductions] presupposes that the abduction is carried out by agents
instructed or authorized by the State, or by private volunteers whose
acts have been adopted or ratified by the State."93
Essentially, in an official abduction, the government exceeds
the limits upon its own powers that were self-imposed by signing an
extradition treaty. Once again, Cook and its discussion of govern-
ment seizures of vessels during prohibition is enlightening. As Jus-
tice Brandeis declared in that case, "[t]he objection is that the
government itself lacked the power to seize, since by the Treaty it had
imposed a territorial limitation upon its own authority."9 4 Similarly,
in this case, the government, by the Extradition Treaty with Mexico,
imposed limits on its own power. These limitations are evidenced
by the many restrictions the Treaty places on extraditions, which
89 Id. (citation omitted).
90 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443 (1886)(emphasis added).
91 For a more detailed discussion of international law and its importance in American
courts, and in the Alvarez-Machain case in particular, see infra notes 144-53 and accompa-
nying text.
92 Frederick Alexander Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 407, 407 (Yoram Din-
stein ed., 1989).
93 Id.
94 Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121 (1933)(emphasis added).
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make little sense unless the Treaty is construed as prohibiting the
United States and Mexico from abducting criminal suspects from
the other nation's territories. 95 The United States exceeded these
limits by officially sponsoring the abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain.
This official sponsorship is quite different from an abduction by a
private party who has not agreed to comply with such limits. Thus,
the fact that there was an officially sponsored abduction in this case
but not in Ker is, contrary to the majority's contention, a crucial
distinction. 96
Additionally, the fact that there was no protest by the Peruvian
government in Ker distinguishes Alvarez-Machain, a point the major-
ity chose to de-emphasize. As explained by the Ninth Circuit in
Verdugo I a protest by the offended nation is necessary to consti-
tute a treaty violation as "extradition treaties are principally
designed to further the sovereign interests of nations, and therefore
any rights they confer on individuals are derivative of the rights of
nations." 98 As no violation of territorial sovereignty has occurred if
a nation has consented to an action in its own territory, 99 a protest
serves the necessary evidentiary function of showing that the of-
fended nation did not consent to the abduction. Indeed, in the Alva-
rez-Machain case, Mexico repeatedly and formally protested the
abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain. 00 Thus, based upon the formal
95 For a more thorough discussion of how the Treaty placed limits on the power of
the United States, see infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
96 See also Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 218 (1906)(McKenna, J., dissent-
ing)("[b]ut how is it when the law becomes the kidnapper, when the officers of the law,
using its forms and exerting its power, become abductors? This is not a distinction
without a difference .... ).
97 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
98 Id, at 1346.
99 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 432(2) & cmts. b & c & Reporters' Note 2 (1987). Section 432(2) reads in full: "A
state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another
state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that
state." Comment c explains in part that:
If the unauthorized action [of a state's law enforcement officials in the territory of
another state] includes abduction of a person, the state from which the person was
abducted may demand return of the person, and international law requires that he
be returned. If the state from which the person was abducted does not demand his
return, under the prevailing view the abducting state may proceed to prosecute him
under its laws.
100 United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 604 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2188 (1992) (discussing the three diplomatic notes of protest sent by the Embassy of
Mexico to the United States Department of State). Similarly, the amicus briefs filed in
this case by the government of Mexico, on behalf of Dr. Alvarez-Machain, clearly express
the anger of the Mexican government over the abduction. Brief for the United Mexican
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
protest and official abduction in Alvarez-Machain, the case is distin-
guishable from Ker and numerous circuit court opinions in which
the abductions were not officially carried out or formally pro-
tested. 10 1 In short, Alvarez-Machain truly presented a "question of
first impression."' 1 2 This question was whether an official abduc-
tion by the United States over the formal protests of an extradition
treaty partner served to disqualify the United States courts from ju-
risdiction over the matter.
B. INTERPRETING THE EXTRADITION TREATY WITH MEXICO
The core of the majority opinion in Alvarez-Machain consisted of
its interpretation of the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty. 0 3
Given the holding in United States v. Rauscher,10 4 if the abduction con-
stituted a violation of the Treaty, jurisdiction would not be permit-
ted. To reach its holding that the Treaty did not prohibit official
abductions, the majority provided a strained reading of the Treaty
and violated accepted norms of treaty interpretation by elevating
the importance of the explicit terms of the Treaty, despite its ambi-
guity, above its purpose and history. The majority also read the
Treaty largely outside the context of the norms of international law.
(1992) (No. 91-712); Brief for the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Granting Review, Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712).
I0 See, e.g., Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 209 (1990) (official abduction from Honduras, but no formal protest by Hon-
duran government); Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304 (11 th Cir. 1987)(abduction from Can-
ada, unofficially by bail bond recovery agents); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308 (9th
Cir. 1980)(Thai government officials "initiated, aided and acquiesced" in a deportation);
United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985
(1975)(expulsion by Mexican army personnel); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975)(abduction from Chile not officially con-
ducted by the United States government, and no subsequent protest by the Chilean
government); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975)(person lured from Argentina to Bolivia, and abducted in
Bolivia, but neither nation protested); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.
1974)(voluntary deportation by Peruvian police in cooperation with United States
agents); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936
(1973) (Vietnamese officials voluntarily delivered person; no extradition treaty with Viet-
nam); Stevenson v. United States, 381 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1967)(deportation from Mex-
ico at initiation of Mexican police); United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), aft'd, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957)(abduction
from Mexico, but no formal protest by the Mexican government).
102 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 (1992)(Stevens, J., dis-
senting). See also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir.
1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
103 See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193-97.
104 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
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1. The Terms of the Treaty
In terms of the explicit language used in the Treaty, the major-
ity was technically correct that the "Treaty says nothing about the
obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible
abductions of people from the territory of the other nation, or the
consequences under the Treaty if such an abduction occurs."' 0 5
There are, in fact, no explicit references to abductions in the Treaty.
However, the majority overemphasized the significance of this
omission. The majority went so far as to misrepresent the standard
method of treaty interpretation spelled out by the Court's earlier
case, Air France v. Saks.' °r Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Air France
for the proposition that "[i]n construing a treaty, as in construing a
statute, we first look to its terms to determine its meaning."' 1 7 Ac-
tually, the Air France opinion said that treaty "analysis must begin...
with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are
used."'108 Thus, the absence of any explicit prohibition on abduc-
tions in the Treaty is less significant than the majority represented,
if the context of the Treaty demonstrates otherwise.
The majority summarily dismissed the reasoning of the lower
court that the Extradition Treaty provided the mandatory procedures
through which the two countries had to act, in order to obtain juris-
diction over alleged criminals in the other country. 10 9 Given the
strong case to be made for the lower court's reading of the Treaty,
this interpretation of the Treaty warranted closer attention by the
majority opinion. 011
A significant number of the articles in the Treaty create excep-
tions as to when extradition is appropriate.' 1 ' In particular, Article
105 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
106 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
107 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
108 Air France, 470 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added).
109 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193-94.
110 This is not meant to suggest that the Supreme Court should have deferred to the
holding below; the Treaty was and should be interpreted de novo by the Court. However,
the Treaty could have been reviewed in accordance with an accepted canon of treaty
interpretation that in the event of two possible interpretations, courts are to choose the
more liberal construction. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. Therefore, the
Court should have at least considered in greater depth whether the interpretation of the
Treaty provided by the court below was an interpretation which, if potentially valid,
should have been preferred according to this canon of construction.
111 E.g., Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2, 31 U.S.T. at 5062-63 (only certain
types of offenses are extraditable); art. 3, 31 U.S.T. at 5063 (minimum amount of evi-
dence required for extradition); art. 5, 31 U.S.T. at 5063-64 (no extradition for political
or military offenses); art. 6, 31 U.S.T. at 5064 (no extradition when person sought was
already prosecuted or tried and convicted or acquitted by requested party for the
claimed offense); art. 7, 31 U.S.T. at 5064-65 (cannot extradite when barred by lapse of
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9 of the Treaty affords the requested nation the option of whether
or not to extradite its own citizens, but requires that the requested
nation try them in its own courts if it refuses extradition. 12 Viewed
in this context, the Treaty makes little sense unless it is understood
as prohibiting abductions."l 3 If one party to the Treaty could sim-
ply abduct persons from the Treaty partner's territory, the excep-
tions would be superfluous. Thus, the Treaty should be read to
affirmatively place limits on the powers of the contracting nations to
abduct persons from the territory of the treaty partner.
This said, given the rule of specialty, 14 governments would
have an incentive to abduct rather than extradite if extradition trea-
ties did not prohibit abductions."i 5 The abducting country would
have substantially greater flexibility in trying a defendant if he were
abducted, because the country would not be subject to the doctrine
of specialty. Therefore, abductions would be more expedient than
formal extradition. However, such encouragement of abduction
over extradition is a far cry from the Extradition Treaty's stated pur-
pose: "[T]o cooperate more closely in the fight against crime and, to
this end, to mutually render better assistance in matters of
extradition."116
time); art. 8, 31 U.S.T. at 5065 (restrictions on extradition when offense is punishable by
death in requesting nation but not in requested nation); art. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 5065 (extra-
dition of nationals of requested party is discretionary); art. 10, 31 U.S.T. at 5066-68
(required procedures for extradition); art. 17, 31 U.S.T. at 5071-72 (rule of specialty).
112 Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, art. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 5065.
113 See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Petitioner's
claim that the Treaty is not exclusive, but permits forcible governmental kidnapping,
would transform these, and other, provisions into little more than verbiage."); Verdugo-
Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1349 ("[A]s the government views extradition treaties in its brief,
the requirements are pure formalities ... ").
See also Bills to Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who Attack U.S. Government
Employees and Citizens Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1986)(statement of Abraham D.
Sofaer, Legal Advisor of the Department of State)(Abductions "might also be viewed by
foreign states as ... incompatible with the bilateral extradition treaties that we have in force
with those nations.")(emphasis added) [hereinafter Prosecution of Terrorists].
114 Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, art. 17, 31 U.S.T. at 5071-72 (explicit require-
ment of doctrine of specialty); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1886)
(holding that the doctrine of specialty is implicitly included in extradition treaties).
As discussed supra note 33 and accompanying text, the doctrine of specialty is the
requirement that the country requesting extradition only try the extradited person for
the offenses stated in the extradition request.
115 The author of a leading treatise on the laws of extradition noted the general incen-
tive problem that occurs if nations are allowed to try defendants officially abducted from
other nations, stating that "[t]o place states in a position where they can benefit from
these practices encourages further violations and erodes voluntary observance of inter-
national law, whether by states or by individuals." BASSIOUNI, supra note 79, ch. 5, § 1,
at 190.
116 Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, 31 U.S.T. at 5061.
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Even assuming that the Treaty could be interpreted as not
prohibiting abductions, such a reading would violate the accepted
canon of treaty construction that treaties should be liberally con-
strued.11 7 As the Court announced previously, "In choosing be-
tween conflicting interpretations of a treaty obligation, a narrow and
restricted construction is to be avoided as not consonant with the
principles deemed controlling in the interpretation of international
agreements."'l 8 In the case of the Extradition Treaty with Mexico,
a narrow and restricted construction is advanced by the Alvarez-
Machain majority: to permit official abductions because they are not
explicitly prohibited. However, this reading blatantly thwarts the
Treaty's purpose of fostering cooperation between the two nations
in the rendition of criminals.' 19 As in other areas of treaty interpre-
tation, such a narrow construction should be rejected in favor of a
reading that is consistent with the purpose of the treaty.
2. The History of Negotiation and Practice Under the Treaty
In evaluating the history of negotiation and practice 20 under
the Treaty, the majority once again neglected to make the crucial
distinction between official government abductions and private
ones.1 21 Thus, the Court erred. It provided two invalid examples
for the proposition that Mexico was forewarned that abductions
were not implicit violations of extradition treaties, yet Mexico re-
frained from demanding that the Treaty explicitly include a prohibi-
tion on abductions. 22
The majority first noted that Mexico was made aware of the Ker
doctrine as early as 1906, yet Mexico failed to demand that a clause
11'7 See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 368 (1989)(quoting Bacardi Corp.
of Am. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940)); Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United
States, 318 U.S. 423,431-32 (1943); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94, 303
(1933).
118 Factor, 290 U.S. at 293.
119 See Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, 31 U.S.T. at 5061.
120 See, e.g., Stuart, 489 U.S. 366 ("Nontextual sources [often are used to help courts
reach the intent of the treaty parties] such as a treaty's ratification history and its subse-
quent operation .... ).
See also BASSIOUNI, supra note 79, ch. 2, § 4.3, at 82 ("Negotiations, preparatory
works, and diplomatic correspondence are an integral part of th[e] surrounding circum-
stances, and [are] often relied on by courts in ascertaining the intentions of the par-
ties.") (citation omitted).
121 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2194-95 (1992).
For a discussion of the significance of the distinction between official and non-offi-
cial abductions, see supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2204-05 (Stevens. J., dissenting) (noting that
both examples advanced by the majority for the proposition that Mexico was forewarned
involved private abductions rather than, as in this case, official abductions).
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be inserted into the Treaty explicitly prohibiting abductions. 123 To
support this proposition, footnote 11 of the Alvarez-Machain opinion
discussed the 1905 Martinez incident, in which a Mexican national
was abducted from Mexico and brought to the United States. 24
United States Secretary of State Blaine, however, informed Mexico
that Ker allowed the United States to have jurisdiction over Martinez
despite the Extradition Treaty.125 Footnote 11, however, failed to
mention that Martinez's abduction, unlike that of Dr. Alvarez-
Machain, was not officially authorized by United States officials.' 26
Thus, in reality, Mexico was never given notice that the Treaty did
not prohibit official abductions.
Similarly, the proposal of legal scholars cited by the majority 27
to add an article to extradition treaties prohibiting jurisdiction over
abducted defendants made no mention of officially sponsored ab-
ductions. 28 In the comment adjoining the proposed article, the
scholars clearly stated that the article was meant as a rejection of
Ker.129 As Ker is not analogous to the official abduction that took
place in this case, by implication the proposed article is also not di-
rectly on point, and therefore cannot be used to show that Mexico
chose not to have the Treaty prohibit official abductions.
It would be truly ironic if the attempt by these scholars to
broaden the respect for international law' 30 were used, as the ma-
jority attempted, to support the breach of a basic tenet of interna-
tional law-that official abductions violate the territorial sovereignty
123 Id. at 2194.
124 Id. at 2194 n.ll (citing LETTER OF ROBERT BACON TO MEXICAN CHARGE, JUNE 22,
1906, H.R. Doc. No. 1, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1121-22 (1909)[hereinafter Bacon
Letter]).
125 Id.
126 The Bacon letter spoke of Ker as holding that extradition treaties do not guarantee
rights of asylum to fugitives. Bacon Letter, supra note 124, at 1122. In the case of official
abductions, as in Alvarez-Machain, however, the objection raised by the respondent is not
that he was denied a right to asylum guaranteed by the Treaty, but that the United States
violated an affirmative limit it placed on its power by the Treaty.
127 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194.
128 See Harvard Research, supra note 44, at 623. The proposed article reads in its
entirety:
In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish
any person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to its author-
ity by recourse to measures in violation of international law or international conven-
tion without first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have
been violated by such measures.
Id.
129 Id. at 631.
130 See id. at 624.
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of the other nation.131 Contrary to the examples raised by the ma-
jority, Mexico had significant reason to believe that the Treaty did,
in fact, prohibit official abductions. This is due to authoritative
statements made by senior United States government officials.
During the 1985 Senate hearings concerning a proposed law to
extend United States jurisdiction over those who attack its citizens
abroad, Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, legal advisor to the State Depart-
ment,13 2 spoke decisively against official abductions from nations
with whom the United States has extradition treaties.' 3 3 In these
hearings, Judge Sofaer demonstrated that he was not overly cau-
tious with respect to most of the proposed extensions of jurisdic-
tion; in fact, he strongly supported them. 134 However, he sharply
criticized the section of the proposed law' 35 that would allow United
States courts to exercise jurisdiction over those officially seized from
the territories of extradition treaty partners. He began his attack in
general terms by stating that "seizure by U.S. officials of terrorist
suspects abroad might constitute a serious breach of the territorial
sovereignty of a foreign state, and could violate local kidnapping
laws .... "1 3 6 He continued, specifically addressing the proposal's
likely violation of extradition treaties, warning "[s]uch acts might
also be viewed by foreign states as ... incompatible with the bilat-
eral extradition treaties that we have in force with those nations."'13 7
Similarly, Secretary of State George Shultz noted that official
abductions are incompatible with extradition treaties.' 38 Secretary
131 See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fact that offi-
cial abductions do violate basic tenets of international law.
132 Judge Sofaer previously served as a federal district court judge for the Southern
District of New York.
133 Prosecution of Terrorists, supra note 113, at 62-73. While the statements made in
these hearings were not directly addressed to Mexico, they were not conducted in isola-
tion. It is quite possible that Mexico, as a party with a definite interest in United States
authorizations of abductions, would follow these discussions made in public hearings.
134 E.g., id. at 63.
135 S. 1373, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
136 Prosecution of Terrorists, supra note 113, at 63.
137 Id. Some may be concerned that a prohibition on official abductions from the
territories of extradition treaty partners would severely frustrate efforts at bringing ter-
rorists, in particular, to justice. However, it should be noted that many of the nations
most notoriously known for their harboring of terrorists do not have extradition treaties
with the United States. Thus, official abductions from these nations, including Libya,
Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Algeria, "present legal issues distinct from the issues
presented in this case." Respondent's Brief at 13 n.7, United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992)(No. 91-712).
138 Statement of Secretary of State George Shultz to the Florida Probation and Parole
Commission, July 22, 1983, reprinted in, Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law, 78 Am. J. r'L L. 200, 207-09 (1984)[hereinaf-
ter Shultz Statement]. Just as discussed in the context of Senate hearings, supra note 113,
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Shultz urged the Florida Probation and Parole Commission to grant
parole to a Canadian citizen in a Florida prison, who was abducted
from Canada (a country with which the United States has an extradi-
tion treaty),13 9 possibly under the authority of Florida state offi-
cials. 140 The Secretary stated that "it is perfectly understandable
that the Government of Canada is outraged by his alleged kidnap-
ping, which Canada considers a violation of the [extradition] treaty
and of international law, as well as an affront to its sovereignty." 141
Significantly, the Extradition Treaty with Canada, just like the
Treaty with Mexico, lacked an explicit prohibition on abductions. 142
Thus, Secretary of State Shultz's comments regarding the Treaty
with Canada should apply to the Treaty with Mexico as well.
In sum, the sources used by the majority in attempting to show
that the Mexican government was on notice that abductions did not
prevent United States courts from asserting personal jurisdiction
over the kidnapped defendant are misplaced, as they are not appli-
cable to officially sponsored abductions. On the contrary, the Mexi-
can government relied on the statements of well-placed United
States government officials to the effect that these abductions were,
in fact, prohibited by the Treaty. Apparently, the Mexican govern-
ment's belief that the Treaty prohibited official abductions was well-
founded. 143
Mexico had an interest in these statements, and therefore may have learned of them as
they were made public. To illustrate, Canada was sufficiently interested in the outcome
of the Alvarez-Machain case to file an amicus brief on behalf of Dr. Alvarez-Machain, as a
Supreme Court interpretation of the Treaty with Mexico would imply a similar interpre-
tation of the Extradition Treaty with Canada, given the similarities between the two trea-
ties. See Brief of the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992)(No. 91-712).
139 Treaty of Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, as amended by an exchange of notes, dated
June 28 and July 9, 1974, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983 [hereinafter Canada Extradition
Treaty].
140 Shultz Statement, supra note 138, at 207-08. Subsequent to Secretary of State
Shultz's statement, however, Jaffe was found to have been privately abducted. Jaffe v.
Smith, 825 F.2d 304, 307-08 (11 th Cir. 1987).
141 Shultz Statement, supra note 138, at 208.
142 See Canada Extradition Treaty, supra note 139, 27 U.S.T. 983.
143 In fact, the Canadian government construed its similar extradition treaty with the
United States in an identical fashion, as seen through their amicus brief in support of Dr.
Alvarez-Machain. See Brief of the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 2-4, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992)(No. 91-
712)(The United States-Canada Extradition Treaty "was negotiated with the under-
standing of Canada that the agreement would provide the exclusive means whereby Can-
ada ... and the United States ... would seek to obtain custody of fugitives from each
other.") (emphasis added).
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3. The Backdrop of Customary International Law
The majority held that there is no implied prohibition on ab-
ductions in the Extradition Treaty based on an interpretation in-
formed by principles of international law. 144 The majority's holding
centered on a criticism of the sources used by the respondent,
claiming that he cited only general principles of international law,
rather than those regarding extradition treaties in particular. 145
Such criticism seems counterintuitive: if international law in general
forbids abductions, it should forbid them, afortiori, in the presence
of extradition treaties. Otherwise, extradition treaties would para-
doxically decrease the protections provided to nations by interna-
tional law. Hence, this Note argues that these general principles of
international law should be utilized in informing the reading of extra-
dition treaties.
Territorial sovereignty is a basic principle recognized by inter-
national law. 146 Furthermore, official abductions constitute viola-
tions of territorial sovereignty, and hence are infractions of
international law. 147 It has even been argued that jurisdiction in the
144 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2195-96 (1992).
The Supreme Court has previously recognized, in a well-known and oft-cited case,
the vital legal status of international law in American courts. The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900)("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts ofjustice .... ).
The importance of interpreting treaties in light of international law principles is
recognized by the Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
23, 1969, art. 31(3), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, reprinted in 63 AM.J. INT'L L. 875, 885
(1969)(In interpreting treaties, "[tihere shall be taken into account, together with the
context ... any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.")[hereinafter Vienna Convention on Treaties].
145 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195-96.
146 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4) ("All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."); Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, art.
17, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2420, as amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 607 ("The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even tempo-
rarily, of ... measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any
grounds whatever. No ... special advantages obtained either by force or by other means
of coercion shall be recognized.").
See also The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. 116, 136 (1812)(Marshall,
CJ.) ("The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute.").
147 See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2201-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct.
2986 (1992) ("territorial integrity of a sovereign nation may not be breached by force").
See also I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 72 (1971)("Where an abduc-
tion is effectively carried out, an infraction of the territorial sovereignty of the host State
has been committed."); Mann, supra note 92, at 407(citing U.N. CHARTER, art. 2).
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Alvarez-Machain case should have been prohibited, and that Dr. Alva-
rez-Machain should have been returned to Mexico, based on inter-
national law alone, regardless of the Extradition Treaty. 148 Even the
majority opinion conceded that "[r]espondent and his amici may be
correct that respondent's abduction was ... in violation of general
international law principles." 149
Given the fact that Mexican government officials were likely fa-
miliar with this widely cited doctrine of international law, it was nat-
ural for these officials to assume that official abductions would
violate the Extradition Treaty. This assumption holds true espe-
cially in light of the Treaty's stated goal to have the two nations
"cooperate more closely in the fight against crime"' 50 and thus pro-
vide protections beyond the standard defaults of international law.
The majority's position that we should not look at international law
principles that apply even in the absence of extradition treaties
would seem to imply that extradition treaties actually decrease the
protections otherwise given to nations by international law. Such an
implication makes a mockery of extradition treaties.
The majority attempted to ridicule the territorial sovereignty
argument with the reductio that even though waging war similarly vi-
olates territorial sovereignty, it stated that "it cannot be seriously
contended [that] an invasion of the United States by Mexico would
violate the terms of the extradition treaty between the two na-
tions."' 15' This reductio misses the mark, however, since waging war
has no serious connection with the stated purpose of the Treaty to
cooperate in the fight against crime. 152 Quite the contrary, abduc-
tions of criminals fall precisely under the sphere of issues that would
logically be included in the purpose of cooperation in the rendition
of criminals. Therefore, it is not a logical extension of the respon-
dent's argument to say that extradition treaties, by implication, pro-
hibit wars. 15 Thus, the territorial sovereignty argument was
wrongly rejected by the majority.
In sum, the Treaty's purpose, when viewed in connection with
the principles of international law, illustrates that the Treaty implic-
148 See, e.g., Keith Highet & George Kahale III, Decision: International Decisions, 86 AM.J.
INT'L L. 811, 815 (1992) ("Because Alvarez's abduction and prosecution violated cus-
tomary international law, he should have been ordered returned to Mexico for that rea-
son alone, irrespective of the Treaty.").
149 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196.
150 Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, 31 U.S.T. at 5061.
151 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196.
152 Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, 31 U.S.T. at 5061.
153 A possible exception to this statement might exist if a war was actually waged for
the purpose of carrying out an abduction.
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itly prohibited abductions. The majority should not have ignored
the relevance of these principles of international law.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALVAREZ-MACHAIN DECISION
The direct implications of the literal holding of the majority in
Alvarez-Machain can be limited by the contractual specificity of treaty
partners. For example, if extradition treaties do not implicitly pro-
hibit official abductions, extradition partners of the United States
can henceforth revise their treaties to add a clause explicitly prohib-
iting abductions.1 54 Given the Court's reading of Rauscher as an ex-
ception to Ker in the event of treaty violations, 155 United States
courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over persons offi-
cially abducted from countries with which the United States signed
an extradition treaty that explicitly prohibited such behavior.
However, the general implications of the decision are far more
ominous. In PresidentJimmy Carter's proclamation of the Extradi-
tion Treaty, he declared that the Treaty "be observed and fulfilled
with good faith .... "156 Even assuming that a strained reading of
the Extradition Treaty might not prohibit officially sponsored gov-
ernment abductions, it certainly was not a "good faith" reading of
the Treaty to permit a "shocking" abduction 57 just because it was
not explicitly prohibited.
Indeed, the majority opinion sanctioned the behavior of the Ex-
ecutive Branch' 58 which was completely at odds with the spirit of the
Treaty and indicative of a bad-faith interpretation of the Treaty.
154 For example, one of the initial responses of the Mexican government of President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari following the Alvarez-Machain decision was to demand that
such a clause be added to its Extradition Treaty with the United States. Tim Golden,
Bush Gives Mexico Limited Pledge on Abductions, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1992, at A5.
155 See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
156 Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, 31 U.S.T. at 5059. See also Vienna Convention on
Treaties, supra note 144, art. 26, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. at 884 ("Every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 325(1) (1987).
157 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (1992).
158 This is not to say that the majority opinion held that official abductions are actually
legal. For example, the abductors may still have violated Mexican and, perhaps, United
States criminal laws. The decision merely held that official abductions did not violate
the Treaty. The false proposition that the decision held abductions to be legal was
stated by many news articles reporting on the decision. For a discussion of these articles
and their misconstruing of the Alvarez-Machain decision, see Malvina Halberstam, Agora:
International Kidnapping: In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L. 736, 736 n.4 (1992).
However, in holding that the Extradition Treaty did not prohibit official abductions,
and that the courts therefore had jurisdiction over Dr. Alvarez-Machain, the majority in
Alvarez-Machain did, to a significant extent, sanction the abduction.
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Current treaty partners of the United States, and those planning to
execute treaties with the United States in the future, should now be
on notice that the United States may not carry out its treaty obliga-
tions in a trustworthy fashion.' 59 This is truly unfortunate because
many nations hold the United States in high esteem. 60
Finally, the core precedent upon which the majority based its
holding, Ker v. Illinois, has itself been widely condemned as anachro-
nistic, with many commentators calling for its reversal.16 ' Rather
than reversing Ker as has been widely suggested, or even limiting
it,162 the majority actually extended Ker by applying it to the new
fact situation of officially, as well as privately, sponsored abductions.
Thus, Ker is highly unstable ground upon which to base such a con-
troversial decision.
D. MISGUIDED POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS
In abducting and trying Dr. Alvarez-Machain, the Executive
Branch, and perhaps even the Supreme Court majority, were likely
159 Perhaps the recent United States presidential election will put an end to this type
of conduct, at least temporarily. As then President-elect Clinton stated, "I believe that
when another nation is willing to obey the law, and in the absence of information that
the government itself has willfully refused to obey the law, that the United States should
not be involved in kidnapping." John M. Broder & Paul Richter, Clinton Vows to Seek
Trade Pact Approval, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1993, at A14. Note, however, the carefully
guarded language Clinton used in condemning official kidnapping. In addition, then
President-elect Clinton directly criticized the Supreme Court decision in Alvarez-
Machain, saying that it "goes way too far." Clinton, High Court Difer on Abduction, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1992, at A32.
160 See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2205-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(noting that
the Supreme Court sets an example to courts throughout the world that emulate it).
161 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 215, 231 (1992)("Ker was decided during a period in United States history noted
for both xenophobia and indifference to the opinions of mankind; other cases during
that period have long ago been discredited.") (citation omitted); H. Moss Crystle, When
Rights Fall in a Forest... The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and American Judicial Countenance of Extra-
territorial Abductions and Torture, 9 DICK. J. INT'L L. 387, 408 (1991) ("The Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine is based upon antiquated and disingenuous standards of state action analysis. The
blind eye it turns to government sponsored abuses abroad is contemptuous for the
human rights of foreign nationals and the sovereignty of other nations."); Jonathan
Gentin, Comment, Government-Sponsored Abduction of Foreign Criminals Abroad: Reflections on
United States v. Caro-Quintero and the Inadequacy of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, 40 EMORY
LJ. 1227, 1230-31 (1991); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Consti-
tution and International Law, Continued, 84 AM.J. INT'L L. 444, 463-64 (1990) (criticizing the
Ker decision as "unconvincing" and anachronistic because today, in contrast to the time
that Ker was decided, "both our concepts of due process and our understanding of indi-
vidual rights under international law are much more developed."); John G. Kester, Some
Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. LJ. 1441, 1449-50 (1988).
162 See, e.g., United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 847 (1975)(Oakes, J., concurring)(expressing a willingness to limit Ker by prevent-
ing its application to cases in which there are official protests).
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motivated, at least in part, by the understandable desire to bring
vicious criminals to justice and to curb the illegal drug trade. In-
deed, this is not the first Supreme Court decision involving the
Camarena murder that has been criticized as being politically
motivated. 163
The Executive Branch freely admits that it was at least partially
motivated by a vengeful spirit.164 While the objectivity of an agency
acting under such strong emotional forces is to be questioned, this
spirit of vengeance is entirely out of place in the Judicial Branch.
While it cannot be stated with certainty that disgust over the
Camarena murder influenced the majority in Alvarez-Machain, this is
clearly the implicit conclusion drawn by the Justices in the minority
opinion. As Justice Stevens noted, the desire to seek revenge
should not be used as a "justification for disregarding the Rule of
Law that this Court has a duty to uphold." 165 It is precisely when
this desire is strong, Justice Stevens continued, that the Court must
be especially careful to render judgment dispassionately.166
The wisdom of the revenge policy is also to be questioned as it
may backfire on the United States. 167 Judge Sofaer warned that the
precise justification given by the United States for seizing suspects
abroad, namely that the countries in which they are located refuse to
extradite them, could similarly be used by other nations against the
United States.168 Quite possibly, a single judicially approved abduc-
tion, as in this case, will lead to a recurring pattern of abductions on
163 E.g., Leonard X Rosenberg, Note, Fourth Amendment-Search and Seizure of Property
Abroad: Erosion of the Rights of Aliens, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 779, 797-98
(1991)(criticizing the Supreme Court's holding in Verdugo I, saying it "may well be
caught up in the 'war on drugs' ").
164 See, e.g., David G. Savage, U.S. Abductions Abroad Upheld, L.A. TIMEs, June 16, 1992,
at Al ("Outraged by [the Camarena murder], fellow DEA agents vowed to gain
revenge.").
165 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2205 (1992)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
166 Id.
167 Significantly, the effort to bring drug dealers hiding in Mexico to justice was only
hampered by the uproar following the Alvarez-Machain decision. See, e.g., Tim Golden,
Bush Gives Mexico Limited Pledge on Abductions, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1992, at A5 (In the
aftermath of the decision, "Mexican officials responded by saying they would tighten
restrictions on agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration and other foreign law
enforcement agencies with which they now cooperate.").
168 Prosecution of Terrorists, supra note 113, at 63 ("I want to also add-and I think this is
an important underlying comment I have to this bill and this committee-that we, the
United States of America, are one of those nations who fail to extradite terrorists.").
See also Brief of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in Support of Affirmance
at 5, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992)(No. 91-712)("The con-
struction [of the Treaty] offered by the Department of Justice in this unprecedented
case, defending the DEA abduction, would allow Mexico to kidnap an American busi-
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the part of both parties to the treaties since the judicial opinion
"amounts to an invitation to the injured State to commit similar ille-
galities in the wrongdoing State." 169
Finally, as well-illustrated by the unraveling events in this
case, 170 a major danger of abductions is that the slipshod manner in
which they are often conducted may subject an innocent person to
barbaric injustices. With little or no pretrial due process rights af-
forded to these abductees, and the Supreme Court's permission to
grant jurisdiction over them, the Executive Branch is given free
reign over such abductions. As one commentator put it, the argu-
ments in favor of abductions of violent criminals are "apt to over-
look that among the persons so treated there may be an innocent
one. This is a great danger, and... for this reason alone, neither
society nor the law must allow a departure from the great principle
that no illegality must ever bear fruit." 17' Indeed, the subsequent
history of Alvarez-Machain makes this admonition all too clear. 172
V. CONCLUSION
The majority in Alvarez-Machain wrongly decided that the Extra-
dition Treaty with Mexico did not prohibit the abduction of Dr. Al-
varez-Machain. Had the Court properly held that the Treaty
prohibited his abduction, it then should have held that under Rau-
scher, United States courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction
over Dr. Alvarez-Machain due to the Treaty violation. As the abduc-
tion of Dr. Alvarez-Machain was officially sponsored by the United
States government, the Court should have distinguished it from Ker,
which lacked such official government approval.
Reading the Treaty in light of its purposes, and the understand-
ing of the two countries as to the Treaty's meaning, this Note argues
nessman from New York City for trial on a political offense, without any violation of the
Extradition Treaty.").
Cf. FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Committee on theJudiciary, 101st Cong, 1st Sess. 2 (1991)(state-
ment of Representative Don Edwards, chairman of the Civil and Constitutional Rights
Subcommittee) (Speaking in the context of official abductions in general, not merely in
the presence of extradition treaties, Edwards stated that "the Iranian Parliament has
cited this Justice Department opinion [supporting official abductions] and says that they
have the same right to come into the United States and arrest Iranian fugitives without
our knowledge and kidnap them.").
169 Mann, supra note 92, at 420.
170 See supra note 25 (noting that the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California, on remand, dismissed the charges against Dr. Alvarez-Machain, upon
finding that the prosecution's evidence was wildly speculative).
171 Mann, supra note 92, at 419.
172 See supra note 25.
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that the Treaty was intended to prohibit the type of official govern-
ment abduction that occurred in this case. Similarly, a reading of
the Treaty, informed by principles of international law, advocates
the same result. While the Court was possibly motivated in part by
an understandable desire to seek revenge on murderers, such a goal
has no place in the courts of a civilized nation.
JONATHAN A. LONNER
